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問曰：佛法中說十二因緣甚深，如說：佛告阿難：是因緣法甚深，難見難解，難覺難觀，細心巧慧人乃能解。愚癡人於淺近法，猶尚難解，何況甚深因緣？今云何言愚癡人應觀因緣法？
答曰：愚癡人者，非謂如牛羊等愚癡；是人欲求實道，邪心觀故生種種邪見。如是愚癡人，當觀因緣，是名為善對治法。若行瞋恚、貪欲人，欲求樂，欲惱他，於此人中，非善非對治法。不淨、慈心思惟，是二人中，是善是對治法。何以故？是二觀能拔瞋恚、貪欲毒刺故。
復次，著常顛倒眾生，不知諸法相似相續；有如是人觀無常，是對治悉檀法，非第一義。何以故？一切諸法自性空故。如偈說言：
無常見有常，是名為顛倒；
空中無無常，何處見有常？
問曰：一切有為法，皆無常相應，是第一義。所以者何？一切有為法，生、住、滅相，前生、次住、後滅故，云何言無常非實？
答曰：有為法不應有三相。何以故？三相不實故。若諸法生、住、滅是有為相者，今生中亦應有三相，生是有為法故；如是一一處亦應有三相，是則無窮，住、滅亦如是。
若諸生、住、滅各更無生、住、滅者，不應名有為法。何以故？有為法相無故。以是故，諸法無常，非第一義悉檀。
復次，若一切實性無常，則無行業報。何以故？無常明生滅失故，譬如腐種子不生果。如是則無行業，無行業云何有果報？今一切賢聖法有果報，善智之人所可信受，不應言無。以是故，諸法非無常性。如是等無量因緣說，不得言諸法無常性。一切有為法無常，苦、無我等亦如是。如是等相，名為對治悉檀。
第一義悉壇
云何名第一義悉檀？一切法性，一切論議語言，一切是法非法，一一可分別破散；諸佛、辟支佛、阿羅漢所行真實法，不可破，不可散。上三悉檀中所不通者，此中則通。
問曰：云何通？
答曰：所謂通者，離一切過失，不可變易，不可勝。何以故？除第一義悉檀，諸餘論議，諸餘悉檀，皆可破故。如眾義經中偈說：
各各自依見，戲論起諍競，
知此為知實，不知為謗法。
不受他法故，是則無智人；
諸有戲論者，悉皆是無智。
若依自見法，而生諸戲論，
若是為淨智，無非淨智者。
於此三偈中，佛說第一義悉檀相。所謂世間眾生自依見，自依法，自依論議，而生諍競；戲論即諍競本，戲論依諸見生。如偈說：
有受法故有諸論，
若無有受何所論？
有受無受諸見等，
是人於此悉已除。
行者能如實知此者，於一切法，一切戲論，不受不著，不見是實，不共諍競，能知佛法甘露味。若不爾者，則謗法。
若不受他法，不知不取，是無智人。如是則諸有戲論者，皆是無智。何以故？各各不相受法故。所謂有人自謂法第一實淨，餘人法妄語不淨。譬如世間治法，刑罰殺戮，種種不淨，世間人信受行之，以為真淨；於餘出家善聖人中，是最為不淨。
待續 |
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Question: In the Buddhadharma it is said that the twelve causes and conditions are extremely profound. For instance, the Buddha told Ananda, “This dharma of causes and conditions is extremely profound, difficult to perceive, difficult to understand, difficult to awaken to, and difficult to contemplate. [Only] a person [equipped with the faculties] of subtle thought and ingenious sagacity would be able to understand.” Deluded individuals find it difficult to understand even shallow and proximate dharmas, how much the more so is this the case with the extremely profound [dharma of] causes and conditions. In this present discourse why do you say that deluded individuals should contemplate the dharma of causes and conditions?
Reply: “Deluded person” is not a reference to delusion on a par with that of oxen or sheep. Such a person desires to seek out the actual Way. [But] because of contemplation undertaken with a mind affected by false premises, he generates all manner of false views. Deluded people like these ought to engage in the contem- plation of causes and conditions. This is a good counteractive dharma.
Because one who acts out of hatefulness or one who acts out of sensual desire wishes to seek [in the one case] after pleasure or wishes [in the other case] to torment others, [causes-and-conditions contemplation] is not good for these people and it is a non-counteractive dharma. For these two types of people, deliberation upon impurity [for the one] and upon kindheartedness [for the other] constitute good and counteractive dharmas. Why? Because these two contemplations are able to pull out the poisonous thorns of hatefulness and desire.
Moreover, those beings who possess the cognitive inversion of being attached to [the illusion of] permanence are not aware that dharmas [only] appear to be continuous. For individuals such as these, the contemplation of impermanence is the [appropriate] counteractive siddhanta dharma. It is not, however, the siddhanta of the supreme meaning. Why [not]? Because all dharmas are devoid of a self-existent nature. This is as stated in a verse:
To see permanence amidst what is impermanent,
This is what is known as cognitive inversion.
Since there is no impermanence in emptiness,
Where could one perceive permanence?
Question: All conditioned dharmas are characterized by impermanence. It should be the case that this is the supreme meaning. Why? All conditioned dharmas are characterized by production, dwelling and extinction. [This is the case] because initially they are produced, then they dwell, and later they become extinct. Why then do you say that impermanence is not actual?
Reply: It should not be the case that conditioned dharmas possess the three characteristics. Why [not]? Because the three characteristics are not real. For instance, all instances of production, dwelling and extinction of dharmas are characteristics of that which is conditioned. Now, production [itself] should also be possessed of the three characteristics because production is [also] a conditioned dharma. In like fashion, at all points [during production] there should exist [all] three characteristics. If this were the case, then this would be endless [and hence absurd]. This would also be the case with regard to dwelling and extinction.
If it were the case that all instances of production, dwelling, and extinction did not each possess production, dwelling and extinction, then they should not be referred to as conditioned dharmas. Why [not]? Because they would not possess the characteristics of conditioned dharmas. On account of this, the [teaching that] “all dharmas are impermanent” does not represent the supreme-meaning siddhanta.
Furthermore, if all things [on the level of their] actual nature were impermanent, then there would be no carrying forth of karmic retribution. Why [not]? Because impermanence refers to disappearance due to [the process of] production and extinction. This is analogous to a rotten seed which does not [have the ability to] produce a fruit. If this were the case, then there would be no carrying forth of karma. If there were no carrying forth of karma, how could there be resultant retribution?
Now, in the Dharma of all of the worthies and sages there is [the teaching of] resultant retribution. This is something which can be believed in and accepted by those possessed of wholesome wisdom. One should not say that it is nonexistent. For this reason, dharmas are of a non-impermanent nature. On account of innumerable reasons such as these [I] say that one cannot maintain that all dharmas are of an impermanent nature. [The teachings] that all conditioned dharmas are impermanent, that they are suffering, and that they are not-self are all similar in this regard. [The teachings which set forth] characteristics such as these fall within the scope of the counteractive siddhanta.
Supreme-meaning Siddhanta
As for the “supreme-meaning siddhanta”, the nature of all dharmas, all dialectical discourse, all categorizations of “correct Dharma” and “non-Dharma”, all of them can be refuted and disintegrated through discrimination. The true and actual Dharma practiced by the Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Arhats cannot be refuted and cannot be disintegrated. Whatever is not reconciled within the three siddhantas treated above is all reconciled herein.
Question: How then are they reconciled?
Reply: That which reconciles transcends all defects, cannot be changed and cannot be vanquished. How is this so? Because aside from the supreme-meaning siddhanta all other dialectical positions and all other siddhantas can be refuted. This is as referred to in verses spoken in the Multitude of Meanings Sutra:
Everyone relies on his own view.
Futile discoursing generates disputes.
If one is able to be aware of another's errors,
This constitutes awareness of the correct view.
If one cannot bear to accept another's dharma,
Such a one is a foolish person.
Whosoever engages in these debates
Is truly a foolish person.
If one relies on one's own view of what is right
And thus begets futile discoursing,
If this constitutes pure wisdom,
Then there is no one of impure wisdom.
In these three verses the Buddha describes the characteristics of the supreme-meaning siddhanta. The so-called “beings of the world” each rely on their own views, each rely on their own dharma and each rely on their own dialectical positions, thus generating disputation. Futile discoursing constitutes the basis of disputation. The arisal of futile discoursing is based upon all manner of views. This is as noted in a spoken verse:
It is on account of accepting dharmas that there is debate.
If there were no[such] acceptance, what would be debated?
Accepting, not accepting and other such views,
This man has gotten rid of them all.
The practitioner who, according with reality, is able to be aware of this, does not tender acceptance nor become attached to any dharma or to any futile discoursing. Neither does he hold the view, “This is real,” or involve himself in disputes with others. He is able to know the sweet dew flavor of the Buddha Dharma. If one is not this way, he slanders the Dharma thereby.
If one refuses to accept any other dharma, does not have knowledge of it, and does not take it up, he is a person devoid of wisdom. If all dialecticians behaved like this then it would follow that they are all devoid of wisdom. How is this so? Because none of them accept anyone else's dharma. This is the so-called case of every person maintaining that his own dharma is the foremost in purity while holding that the dharmas of others are but false discourse and impure.
Take for instance the worldly methods of correction. The ancient methods of correction involve corporeal punishments, execution and all manner of impurity. The people of the world have faith in them, accept them, carry them out, and are of the opinion that they are truly pure [practices]. But from the standpoint of others, wholesome and sagely people among the renunciates, these [practices] are the most impure.
To be continued |
