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					鈴木先生是這樣說的:「如果現在有可能與他們談論的話,我會告訴他們我的思想已經與他們的有些不同了。我現在想說一個宗教光靠科學是不夠的。我們每個人身上都有一些神秘成份在,不要光為了迎合科學就把它們都丟了。這是我個人深深的體會。」 
					不單鈴木是這樣;以前人類都以科學為化解人間百難的萬靈丹。但是經過兩次世界大戰的負面影響,「科學技術」與「人類無知」的不幸結合,造成種種怵目驚心事件之後,人類對於科學的熱忱和樂觀大大地降低了。生化戰爭、核子彈、環境污染,以及人類胚胎試驗,和方興未艾的基因工程研製生命這一個幽靈,都將「科學進步創造智慧和道德標準」這一夢幻化為泡影。科學對社會福利和人文價值的模糊關係,大眾的關注正與日俱增。總體而言,以前卡勒斯對科學的癡迷,大眾是不會有絲毫懷疑的;現在這種疑慮卻是極為普遍:科學難道真的能瞭解自然嗎?真的能夠滿足人類的需求嗎? 
					現代科學的組織裏正少了道德成份做基礎,因而造成了科學上的發明及其在應用上,有許多是不健全而有毒害的。對這一點,佛教徒不應感到驚訝,因為就是在這裡佛教與科學開始分道揚鑣的,人類再也無法去比較兩者了。您會注意到所有的東方宗教裡有一共同點,我這認為是一種很顯著的認識事物的模式:就是一個主題會一而再,再而三地重複著。在梵文裡稱為「尸羅」、「三摩地」、「般若」(戒、定、慧)。道德成份在這些宗教裡怎麼樣強調都不為之過份;要得見事物真相就當先清淨心地。另外《清淨道論》一書是四世紀早期佛教的一部手册。此書列舉了佛的「科學性認知」的三個步驟:善功德、禪定、得見萬物的眞正實相。 
					這與現代科學的認識方法和前提條件大相逕庭。你們從史坦福大學來的或是柏克萊加大來的學生或老師,我不相信你們在接受科學訓練,甚至在學科學史時,有人會碰到這種古老的方法論。當你們要去上理、工課時,沒人會說:「你們要帶分度器、工程計算器和電腦,當然,寫報告時你們先要上『道德』和『打坐』的實驗課。」這些都不是一個現代科學家的標準實驗室器材;可是沒有這些東西在東方宗教裡則沒有什麼科學可言。如果再要談科學就如空中樓閣一樣——沒底。這一總綱貫穿所有東方宗教:道教講修心,心為所有知識和感知的總儲藏庫。心左右身,心是精神的;心為聖王,唯居淨處。知識和眞理亦只有心清淨時才會在你的心紮下根。有趣的是這些古代智慧型的宗教,都認為眞正知識的獲取有一前提條件——操行的清淨;而今天的我們,若是還沒有把這些看成是毫不相干的束西的話,也已把這點看成是非物質性的了。 
					公元前4~3世紀中的《管子》一書中說:「人欲知者『彼』(外部世界),知『彼』之道『此』(自身、心)。何以知『彼』?惟以臻善『此』。」 
					早在公元前4~3世紀,人們就已經意識到現代科學所面臨的認識方法論上的一些棘手問題。您可以說科學的目標在於認識自然世界;那就是——人欲知者「彼」;但是,新科學很熱切地指出,我們認識「彼」的方法是通過「此」。那也就是說,我們研究自然,得到對自然的一種瞭解,這成果與方法之間是獨立的,現在這種說法已經不再是理所當然的了。將主體和客體作楚漢之分的時代已如水之東逝。正如海申伯格先生說的,測量過程的本身都會影響到所測量的事物,現在這完全是有可能的。如果一位探索眞理的科學家改變他的探索目標,那麼他——觀察者——的身外世界所處狀態就可加一個問號了。海申伯格引入一個新概念——「模糊原則」,並觀察說:「甚至在科學中,研究物的本身都不再是純自然,而是研究者所研究下的自然。」 
					所以,管子第三行所指出的,其實是現代科學所感困擾的一個為難之處:「我們如何去認識『彼』呢?」 
					甚至愛因斯坦也感覺到這種挑戰,使維護他的觀點越來越困難,因為他的外部世界受著科學所能發現的宇宙機械所控制。你可以這麼說,公元前4~3世紀一首中國偈中所設下的謎,在今天的量子物理都還沒能令我們取得更深一層的明白。 
					管子的沉思:「人皆欲知,而不問何以知之。」如果觀察的結果,是受觀察者的觀察方式而決定的,那麼我們還談什麼去認識身外的客觀世界呢?我們在研究自然的時候,是不是也在研究我們自己呢?那麼新科學會不會有一天回到管子的結論,即「惟以臻善此,方可了知彼」呢?我不想去爭說量子物理最後是否會得出這個結論,但是我不會覺得驚訝,如果我們最後所得到的答案是:「只有觀察者自身完善了,他所觀察的事物才會了了然。」這個完善是指自身品德的完善和我們所稱「克列沙」——佛教中的煩惱,諸如貪、瞋、癡、慢、自私等各種感情的極端。儒教中的孟子,談他稱為「不動心」;他四十歲時所達到的境界。他也談通過修德而得的平心靜氣;這與通過思維而得的知識和本身智能觀察而獲得的知識是不同的。就我所明白吠陀教,它對這一點也是講得很清楚的。 
					待續 | 
                   | Suzuki reflected, "If it were possible for 
					me to talk with them now, I would tell them that my ideas 
					have changed from theirs somewhat. I now think that a 
					religion based solely on science is not enough. There are 
					certain 'mythological' elements in every one of us, which 
					cannot be altogether lost in favor of science. This is a 
					conviction I have come to."  
					Suzuki was not alone. The negative effects of two World 
					Wars, both frightening examples of the ill-fated marriage of 
					scientific technology and human ignorance, did much to 
					damper enthusiasm and optimism for science as a panacea for 
					human problems. Chemical and biological warfare, nuclear 
					bombs, environmental pollution, along with experiments on 
					human embryos and the burgeoning spectre of genetically 
					engineered life—all shatter illusions that science per se 
					spells progress or generates wisdom and ethical imperatives. 
					Public concern over the dubious relationship of science to 
					social benefits and human values if anything seems to be 
					growing. In sum, doubts that would never have troubled Paul 
					Cams' infatuation with science have now become commonplace: 
					Is science sufficient for describing reality? Is it capable 
					of meeting human needs?  
					This idea: that the very fabric of modern science is lacking 
					this grounding in the moral sphere, and as a result its 
					discoveries and uses are incomplete and often deleterious, 
					should not surprise a Buddhist. For it is here that the 
					marriage between Buddhism and science begins to unravel, and 
					where the comparison breaks down. You will notice that 
					throughout the East Asian traditions there exists what I 
					call a rather distinctive epistemological model or way of 
					knowing; a theme that repeats itself again and again. In 
					Sanskrit it's called sila, samadhi, and prajna (morality, 
					concentration, wisdom). The ethical component cannot be 
					overemphasized. For, in order to see things as they are, 
					there has to be this purification of the mind—a 
					rectification on the part of the beholder. Another text, The 
					Visuddhi Magga, ("The Path of Purification"), an early 
					Buddhist manual from the fourth century, describes the 
					Buddha's science of inquiry as a three-step path: virtue, 
					meditation, and then insight into the nature of all things 
					as they really are.  
					This approach presents something quite different from the 
					premises and procedures of modern science. Any of you 
					students or faculty here from Stanford or U.C. Berkeley, I 
					doubt you will have encountered this ancient methodology as 
					part of your scientific training-even in the History of 
					Science. When you go into your science classes nobody says, 
					"You will need a protractor, an advance-function calculator, 
					a computer, and of course be expected to sign up for the lab 
					section on virtue and meditation, prior to writing up your 
					insights." These are not the standard laboratory equipment 
					of a modern-day scientist. And yet, without these, in the 
					Eastern spiritual and philosophical sense, you cannot have 
					science. This is "science" without a firm foundation. This 
					formula is not unique to Buddhism; it appears throughout the 
					Eastern traditions: Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, 
					Hinduism. Taoism, for example, speaks about cultivating the 
					mind (xin), and regards the mind as a repository of all 
					perceptions and knowledge. It rules the body. It is 
					spiritual. And like a divinity, it will abide only where all 
					is clean. This knowledge, this truth can only abide where 
					the mind is made clean—meaning, one must be morally sound 
					and grounded. It is interesting that these ancient wisdom 
					traditions considered moral purity as the absolute 
					prerequisite of true knowledge, and that we today regard it 
					as immaterial, if not downright irrelevant.  
					The Kuan Tzu—a text from around the fourth to third century 
					B.C.—stated: "What all people desire to know is that 
					(meaning the external world), but our means of knowing that 
					is by this (our self, our mind)." How can we know that (the 
					external world)? Only by perfecting this.  
					Already in the fourth to third century B.C., there was an 
					awareness of some of the sticky epistemological problems 
					confronting modern science. You could say that the goal of 
					science is to know the natural world, i. e., "What all 
					people desire to know is that.'" But, as the "new science" 
					so keenly points out, our means of knowing that is through 
					this. That is to say, the possibility of achieving a 
					description of the world that is independent of the means by 
					which it was investigated can no longer be taken for 
					granted. Gone is the neat subject/object distinction. It now 
					seems entirely possible as Heisenberg pointed out, that the 
					very act of measurement interferes with what one is 
					attempting to measure. If the scientist in search of truth 
					alters the very truth he or she seeks, then the very 
					existence of a world external to the observer can be 
					doubted. Heisenberg introduced the "uncertainty principle," 
					and observed, "even in science the object of research is no 
					longer nature itself, but man's investigation of nature."
					 
					So, the third line of the Kuan Tzu could in fact pose the 
					very dilemma modern scientists now grapple with: "How can we 
					know that?"  
					Even Einstein felt the challenge—maintaining and defending 
					with increasing difficulty his belief in the reality of an 
					external world governed by mechanisms that science could 
					disclose. You could say, that quantum physics has brought us 
					no further along in our understanding than to the conundrum 
					posed in the third line of a Chinese verse from fourth 
					century B.C.  
					The Kuan Tzu ponders, "All men desire to know, but they do 
					not enquire into that whereby one know." How indeed can one 
					know anything external when all that is known is known 
					through the mode of the perceiver? Are we studying ourselves 
					when we think we are studying nature? Will the "new science" 
					eventually come to the conclusion of Kuan Tzu, that only "by 
					perfecting this," can we truly know that? It is an 
					interesting question: how accurate and objective can the 
					observation be if the observer is flawed and imperfect? And 
					again, this perfection refers to the cultivation of moral 
					qualities and the elimination of what we call klesa, which 
					in Buddhism refers to afflictions such as greed, hatred, 
					ignorance, pride, selfishness, and a variety of attachments 
					and emotional extremes.  
					Mencius, in the Confucian tradition, talks about what he 
					calls, "the unmoving mind" that he acquired at the age of 
					40. This refers to knowledge derived from the cultivation of 
					equanimity resulting from the exercise of a moral sense. 
					This "good knowledge" is gained by intuitive insight, and is 
					to be distinguished from knowledge acquired through mental 
					activity.  
					To be continued  |